Ongoing regional tensions, including the breakdown of the US-Iran ceasefire and renewed military activity near the Strait of Hormuz, sustain elevated risks that support partial airspace restrictions in Iran’s western FIR. Iranian authorities have kept the western sector closed indefinitely since June 2026 following missile exchanges, while the eastern portion remains open for limited overflights, with few international operators using it. EASA’s CZIB through August 31, 2026, along with national NOTAMs from France, Germany, and Italy, advises full avoidance due to air defense threats and potential misidentification. Diplomatic signals on August 28 regarding conditions for Strait of Hormuz reopening highlight ongoing leverage dynamics but do not indicate imminent full closure. These factors shape trader assessments of escalation probability versus de-escalation windows.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · UpdatedIran full airspace closure by...?
$8,716,510 Vol.
August 31
1%
September 30
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December 31
18%
$8,716,510 Vol.
August 31
1%
September 30
6%
December 31
18%
A “general closure” refers to a cancellation or suspension of aviation which is generally applicable to all commercial flights transiting Iranian airspace (“Tehran FIR”). A qualifying closure must apply generally to all of Iran or the Tehran FIR; limited cancellations, delays, or partial closures will not qualify. A closure which applies generally to commercial aviation across Iranian airspace, with limited exceptions for certain categories of flights, however, will qualify (e.g. exceptions for certain flights pre-approved by the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority may be permitted).
Qualifying previous examples include the February 28, 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602289115) and the January 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace except to international flights with express governmental permission (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/). Non-qualifying examples include the January 27, 2026 partial closure of Iranian airspace around the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-issues-airspace-notice-for-military-drills-near-strait-of-hormuz/3812508), the April 2024 closure of Iran’s western airspace (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-airports-cancel-flights-until-monday-morning-2024-04-14/), and the January 25 - April 25, 2026 VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights suspension which did not broadly close commercial aviation in Iran (https://www.intellinews.com/iran-suspends-general-aviation-and-vfr-flights-in-new-airspace-directive-421997/).
Warnings, No-Fly-Zones, or other flight restrictions imposed by airlines or countries other than Iran will not be sufficient for a “Yes” resolution.
Airspace closures which occur solely due to weather conditions, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions, will not qualify.
The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from Iranian aviation authorities and a consensus of credible reporting.
Market Opened: Jul 27, 2026, 1:36 PM ET
Resolver
0x65070BE91...A “general closure” refers to a cancellation or suspension of aviation which is generally applicable to all commercial flights transiting Iranian airspace (“Tehran FIR”). A qualifying closure must apply generally to all of Iran or the Tehran FIR; limited cancellations, delays, or partial closures will not qualify. A closure which applies generally to commercial aviation across Iranian airspace, with limited exceptions for certain categories of flights, however, will qualify (e.g. exceptions for certain flights pre-approved by the Iranian Civil Aviation Authority may be permitted).
Qualifying previous examples include the February 28, 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace (https://www.iranintl.com/en/202602289115) and the January 2026 total closure of Iranian airspace except to international flights with express governmental permission (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iran-shuts-airspace-most-flights-flightradar24-says-2026-01-14/). Non-qualifying examples include the January 27, 2026 partial closure of Iranian airspace around the Strait of Hormuz (https://www.aa.com.tr/en/middle-east/iran-issues-airspace-notice-for-military-drills-near-strait-of-hormuz/3812508), the April 2024 closure of Iran’s western airspace (https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/iranian-airports-cancel-flights-until-monday-morning-2024-04-14/), and the January 25 - April 25, 2026 VFR (Visual Flight Rules) flights suspension which did not broadly close commercial aviation in Iran (https://www.intellinews.com/iran-suspends-general-aviation-and-vfr-flights-in-new-airspace-directive-421997/).
Warnings, No-Fly-Zones, or other flight restrictions imposed by airlines or countries other than Iran will not be sufficient for a “Yes” resolution.
Airspace closures which occur solely due to weather conditions, earthquakes, or volcanic eruptions, will not qualify.
The primary resolution sources for this market will be official information from Iranian aviation authorities and a consensus of credible reporting.
Resolver
0x65070BE91...Ongoing regional tensions, including the breakdown of the US-Iran ceasefire and renewed military activity near the Strait of Hormuz, sustain elevated risks that support partial airspace restrictions in Iran’s western FIR. Iranian authorities have kept the western sector closed indefinitely since June 2026 following missile exchanges, while the eastern portion remains open for limited overflights, with few international operators using it. EASA’s CZIB through August 31, 2026, along with national NOTAMs from France, Germany, and Italy, advises full avoidance due to air defense threats and potential misidentification. Diplomatic signals on August 28 regarding conditions for Strait of Hormuz reopening highlight ongoing leverage dynamics but do not indicate imminent full closure. These factors shape trader assessments of escalation probability versus de-escalation windows.
Experimental AI-generated summary referencing Polymarket data. This is not trading advice and plays no role in how this market resolves. · Updated



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